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Even if a court meets jurisdictional criteria, it may decline to exercise its jurisdiction, and it must in some cases if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum for making such determinations under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. Klumpner v. Klumpner.
This Act requires that the trial court decline jurisdiction once it is aware that it may be an inconvenient forum, and that the court of another state is more appropriate. In re Pavelcik.
Even where the requirements of 750 ILCS 35/4 are met and the court has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination, it may decline to exercise it if it finds that court to be an inconvenient forum for the determination under the circumstances of the case, and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. Noga v. Noga.
This Act involves a process in which the court must first resolve whether it has jurisdiction under 750 ILCS 35/4, and after such a finding, it must determine under this section and 750 ILCS 35/7 whether it should decline to exercise jurisdiction. In re Levy.
Atty. No.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT - SECOND DISTRICT
Z AN ILLINOIS
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, v.
No. 2002
TAMMY
Defendant.
AFFIDAVIT REGARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES
I, Attorney of Record, being duly sworn on oath, having personal knowledge of the relevant herein, and if called as a witness would competently testify as follows:
1. That Affiants are attorneys, licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois since 1988, and 1990 respectively, and that they is paid $100.00 per hour for office time and $125.00 per hour for court time.
2. That Affiants have rendered the usual and customary services as the attorneys for the Plaintiff in regards to the above action and other relief.
3. That the attached itemized statement, marked Exhibit “A”, attached hereto and incorporated herein, as to the services rendered regarding this case is correct to the best of our knowledge.
FURTHER AFFIANTS SAYETH NOT.
Attorney
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS
COUNTY OF C O O K )
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.
Attorney
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Gift
The circuit court’s conclusion that the bracelet given to petitioner by respondent’s mother, who carried insurance on it, belonged to the petitioner was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; therefore, bracelet was not included in marital property. In re Simmons
The trial court erred in awarding gold cross to petitioner wife as her separate non-marital property where the evidence established that it was given to husband by his uncle many years prior to the marriage and there was no affirmative proof of an intention to make a gift to the wife. In re Uluhogian
Improvement
The stores owned by a husband prior to the marriage remained non-marital despite their absorption of some marital resources because it was permissible for one spouse to improve the other spouse’s non-marital property without making that property marital. In re Kennedy
Individual Retirement Account
Where an Individual Retirement Account was treated as the exclusive property of husband since he used the account as an adjustment to income on his separate tax return, this was property acquired solely by husband during the marriage and fell within the exclusion of the prenuptial agreement. In re Burgess
Investment
The interest earned during the marriage on one spouse’s investment account was her non-marital property, as an increase in the value of property acquired before marriage remained non-marital property. In re Deem
Legislative Intent
The intent of this section as a whole was designed to eliminate disparity between the marriage partners; however, the exceptions (1) through (6) of subsection 9a) of this section manifest the legislative purpose to preserve the character of non-marital property in those situations where the actions of the parties have not created ambiguity. In re Smith
Test
Where property was acquired before marriage, title is a relevant indicator to determine at the time of dissolution whether the property has remained non-marital. In re Drennan
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The court abused its discretion in dividing military pension by failing to comply with § 401(b) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/401(b)) to preserve jurisdiction for the distribution of military pension benefits. In re Burkhart
Military pensions may be treated as marital property under Illinois law and are subject to the division provisions of this section. In re Brown
Even had the husband’s military pension not been considered marital property and subject to apportionment, it would certainly have been considered as a relevant factor in a “fair and equitable” division of marital property. In re Lipkin
A marital property interest may be recognized in retirement benefits from a military pension. In re Dooley
Where no evidence was presented in trial of the present value of the husband’s military retirement pension, and the accommodation made with maintenance awarded to the wife to balance the award of all the retirement pay to the husband was difficult to evaluate, the matter was not fully presented to the trial court and the judgment distributing the marital property of the parties and awarding maintenance in the amount and for the term ordered had to be reconsidered by the trial court. In re Dooley
Military retirement pension is “marital property” under this Act. Musser v. Musser
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Purpose of Requests for Admission
Under Supreme Court Rule 216, a party can serve on any other party a written request for the admission of the truth of any fact or the genuineness of any document. While the scope of a request is limited only by the imagination of the trial lawyer, the most common use of requests for admission in divorce litigation is to obtain the admission of documents without the need for calling a witness at trial to establish a foundation for the document. For example, a trial lawyer who plans on offering bank records into evidence at trial can establish the authenticity of the records and lay a foundation that the records are business documents by a request for admission served on the opposing party instead of by calling a witness from the bank.
Practice
Under plain meaning of Supreme Court Rule 216, a party served with a request for admission must either answer or object within 28 days or the matters in the request are deemed admitted. However, the courts seem reluctant to enforce Rule 216 as written. Supreme Court Rule I83 expressly provides that the court “for good cause shown on motion after notice to the opposite party, may extend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is requested by the rules to be done within a limited period, either before or after the expiration of the time.” As a result, and not surprisingly, most courts will allow a party to serve a late response to a request to admit under certain circumstances. See Smoot v. Knott, 200 Ill.App.3d 1982, 558 N.E.2d 794, 146 Ill.Dec. 831 (5th Dist. 1990), for an exhaustive survey of the law across the state with regard to whether a court has discretion to allow a late response to a request for admission. However, it should be noted that in Bright v. Dicke 166 Ill.2d 204, 652 N.E.2d 275, 209 Ill.Dec. 735 (1995), the Supreme Court specifically stated that the Smoot court’s rationale in allowing service of a late response was flawed. It is not enough that the propounding party is not prejudiced by late response was flawed. It is not enough that the propounding party is not prejudiced by late service. The responding party has the burden of showing good cause as to why the response is late.
Beyond that, courts have refused to enforce Rule 216 under other circumstances. In Deboe v. Flick, 172 Ill.App.3d 673, 526 N.E.2d 913, 122 Ill.Dec. 510 5th Dist. 1988), with an unclear record from the trial court, the appellate court refused to consider facts that were admitted through a request for admission because the request for admission was not timely brought to the attention of the trial court and because the party that served the request for admission introduced evidence at trial on the facts deemed to be admitted and so “waived” its right to rely on the admitted facts. In LaSalle National Bank of Chicago v. Akande, 235 Ill.App.3d 53, 600 N.E.2d 1238, 175 Ill.Dec. 780 (2d Dist. 1992), the party served with a request for admission simply wrote a letter to the other party stating that it, the first party, was not responding to the request for admission. No objection was filed with the trial court. Nonetheless, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in not allowing a late response to the request for admission.
In 1998, the Supreme Court reexamined the purpose and scope of requests to admit facts in P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill.2d 224, 703 N.E.2d 71, 234 Ill.Dec. 459 (1998). Shred Pax served a set of requests for admission on PRS; however, PRS failed to deny or object to the requests within 28 days. Based on the non-response, the requests were deemed admitted. Thereafter, Shred Pax moved for and was granted summary judgment in the case.
After reversal by the appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Shred Pax’s leave to appeal. In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court drew clearer boundaries as to what can and cannot be asked in a request to admit. In accordance with P.R.S., a litigant may ask the opponent to admit so-called “ultimate facts” that lead the trier of fact to infer an element of a case, but a litigant may not ask an opponent to admit a legal conclusion. Even if the party receiving a request to admit never response to it, a request that asked for a legal conclusion will still not be deemed admitted. 703 N.E.2d at 77.
For example, a proper request to admit may state: “In 1998, Mrs. Smith spent $20,000 of the assets from a joint account on a Rolex watch for her boyfriend.” An improper request would state: “In 1998, Mrs. Smith dissipated the parties’ marital estate in the amount of $20,000.” The first request seeks an “ultimate fact” in proving dissipation, but the second seeks to admit the legal conclusion of dissipation itself.
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The tiral court did not abuse its discretion by requiring father to pay the medical expenses of children to the extent those expenses were covered by his insurance. Imes v. Imes.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting the child support payments of father at $25 per week for daughter. Imes v. Imes.
Where respondent husband did not object to the terms of the dissolution judgment imposing support obligations solely on him, and where he never appealed the dissolution judgment, the trial court properly ordered that the noncustodial wife was not required to pay child support. In re Kraft.
The support of a child is the joint and several obligation of both the husband and the wife. In re Butler.
The financial responsibility for the support of the child is a joint and several obligation of each parent, and is proper for the court to consider the income and assets of the wife and husband in setting the amount awarded. Riordan v. Riordan.
The obligation of the father to support his children begins when the child is born and continues during the minority of the child. This obligation of the father to support his minor child is not affected by a decree granting a divorce, nor by a decree granting the care and custody of his child to his wife or some other suitable person. Nelson v. Nelson.
When the parents of a child are divorced and no mention is made in the decree for the care and custody of minor child, under the law, the father is still bound to provide a reasonable and proper support for a minor child. People ex rel. Hartshorn v. Hartshorn.
The duty of a parent to support his minor child arises out of a natural relationship. Nelson v. Nelson.
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Where there was no support in the record for the belief that the trial court’s decision on child support payments should be affected by defendant’s foster children, as he had no financial responsibility for them because they were provided for by the state, defendant’s foster children should not have been a consideration in the court’s child support payment decision. People v. Hines.
Evidence of defendant’s emotional problems after being involuntarily discharged in 1975, his attempts to find work both in Chicago and California, and his current financial and employment situation supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was acting in good faith in seeking an abatement of his child support obligations. Glass v. Peitchel.
A construction of the act that does not enforce provisions which rely solely upon a percentage, but does enforce provisions with a minimum or “final” dollar figure carries out the statutory goals of the legislative enactment. In re LIss.
The standards contained in this section regarding child support are applicable to the determination of temporary child support. In re Rogliano.
The guidelines for determining child support contained in this section much be followed when a court determines support in cases brought under the Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/10-10). People ex rel. Browning v. Melton.
The percentage guidelines set forth in subsection (a) of this section establish a “minimum” amount of supporting party’s net income, not a “maximum.” In re McBride/
The substantive factors of subsection (a) of this section have been adopted by the courts as a point of reference for determining motions filed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; however, it does not require the trial court to either adhere to the minimum percentage guidelines or to make specific findings to explain its departure therefrom. Daredeuff v. Daredeuff.
Where trial court ordered respondent to pay $700 or 45% of his net income, whichever would be greater, and as for child support, the trial court’s judgment may be affirmed to the extent that it stated respondent’s support obligation in a specific dollar amount if that determination is otherwise valid. In re Fahy.
Where the individual incomes of both parents are more than sufficient to provide the reasonable needs of the parties’ children, taking into account the lifestly the children would have absent the dissolution, the court is justified in setting a figure below the guideline amount. In re Bush.
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Money loaned by the wife to her husband’s corporation was a gift rather than a loan since the wife testified that she considered that transfer of funds a loan, but there was conflicting testimony as to whether she had ever discussed with the husband the matter of repayment, and she requested no security whatsoever for the transfer. In re Didier
Petitioner did sustain her burden in proving that ex-husband’s deposits into I.R.A. account were gifts, as he testified at length to his intent and knowledge that the money would go into petitioner’s I.R.A. account and would be in her5 sole control and the fact that the respondent made the gift for tax purposes was of no consequence. In re Weiler
The finding of the trial court that real property held by the respondent subject to his obligation to care for the grantor was a gift to respondent and was non-marital property had ample support in the record and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Bentley
Because the parties stood in a relation of trust and confidence, appellant had the burden of showing the justness and fairness of his dealings with wife’s stocks. Wesselhoeft v. Wesselhoeft
Despite husband’s denial of donative intent and his continued control of property he purchased, he failed to rebut the presumption that the conveyance to his wife was a gift and plaintiff’s intent at the time that he deeded the property to defendant was the controlling factor; consequently, the circumstances at time of the conveyance and his own testimony established that he intended a present, irrevocable transfer of the property to wife. West v. West
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Wife could bring an action under a prior similar provision for the determination of equities in property and of alimony and attorney fees where the marital status had been determined by a valid ex parte foreign decree, but such latter court was without personal jurisdiction to determine equities in property or alimony. Sidwell v. Sidwell
Recourse in Illinois
Former wife, whose marriage had been dissolved by German court, had no recourse under this Act for determination of allocation of former husband’s military pension or other marital property. In re Brown
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